121 554 571 156 My approach here is to state the problem of authority and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

124 554 156 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the authority structure.[2] I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?";"Who knows the wants and needs of the [571] Bedouin most intimately?" On the basis of the data collected in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure. [126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

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[2]The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

1: Obermeyer E-5 (1964-1965) 1969 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
'Aishaibat

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121 I know that Hajj 'Ali consciously and actively seeks to be a leader among the Bedouin, that he seeks a place in the new governmental structure in Marsa Matruh, and hence that he desires power, however benevolent his intentions may be. In what follows, I hope to bring this out by presenting Hajj 'Ali as himself and as a "cultural broker."

When I say that Hajj 'Ali desires power I mean nothing derogatory. Power-seeking is a kind of social phenomenon which characterizes man-in-society around the world: the quest occurs in primitive and modern groups, and university structures alike (Moore 1958:1-30). Hajj 'Ali's desire for power, and also authority, has not wrought change in the whole structure of the al-Qasr social system. As we shall see, Hajj 'Ali is discontent with the present structure of al-Qasr and feels that the Bedouins must accept change. His discontent is related to the changing conditions in and about al-Qasr; the chance to express it or re-channel it, at this time, derives from his ascribed place in the al-Qasr system. Whether his desire for power is a result or a cause of his discontent I cannot tell. Only a personality study in depth could answer this question.

In terms of this study, one way to look at Hajj 'Ali's case is to view it as his attempt to convert power in the internal system into authority in the external system. But in this context "external" refers to the national level rather

•156 554 121 [177] than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional system, his influence and power have been informal, and, although this has been advantageous over against the formal role of 'aqila, his political activity was ultimately limited by this structural differentiation and definition of authority. In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties, Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority structure which has reference to both the internal and external political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 [634] In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a "most powerful bait." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of 'umda: in *613 159 581 156 [595] 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously been made as economic and political moves. A check on his wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj 'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to his own property in the 'izba sector of al-Qasr. The one exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

*613 with Bait Bu Taram of 'Ailit Lazumi. These marriages and
159 their resultant alliances enhance the political power and
581 social status of Hajj 'Ali within and without al-Qasr.
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Although he has no education himself, and neither reads
159 nor writes, Hajj 'Ali has sent his son to the University of
156 Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali's son is the only boy from al-Qasr
873 ever to attend the university. Hajj 'Ali desired that his
[212] son study law at the university or enter the military academy "and become an officer." But his son objected to this, saying: "Either way I will be employed by the government and will not be permitted to travel and see other countries." Hajj 'Ali did not argue with this: he said that his son should study what he wished. The son is now studying in the Faculty of Commerce
156 at Alexandria. Hajj 'Ali is also sending his daughters to
159 the primary school in al-Qasr. Not all of the Bedouins believe
872 that girls should receive an education.
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Hajj 'Ali places among the "status group" in terms
156 of wealth. Although he has now committed himself to olive-
159 farming as a way of life, he remains one of the biggest sheep
554 owners in al-Qasr. Therefore, he is identified with both tra-
472 ditional and modern symbols of status. Hajj 'Ali differs in
156 one important way from other members of the "status group"
159 in that he owns three small general stores, two in al-Qasr
554 and one far to the west in Sallum. This fact has several
443 significant implications. Shops in al-Qasr (there are five
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156 of them) cater largely to the needs of the lineage in whose
159 territory they are located. They are operated mostly on a
554 credit basis. Lineage members, as debtors, feel gratitude
443 but also, and more importantly, loyalty toward their kinsman
423 and creditor. Hajj 'Ali is the only member of al-Qasr who
472 owns two shops, and the only Bedouin in the whole Western Desert
[613] who owns three shops. His brother owns a shop in Matruh.
[452] Furthermore, the shop in Sallum is in a strategic position on
156 the Libyan border which, coincidentally or not, is a point
159 for importing, and also smuggling, foreign goods into Egypt.
554 The possession and utilization of foreign products is definitely
443 a status symbol all over Egypt. Hence, the person in this
439 area who can control, however slightly, the distribution of
472 such goods has a lever with which to exact prestige and
favors from the "status group" in al-Qasr who now welcome
these symbols (tobacco, pistols, rifles, radios) and the
bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh who crave them (food goods,
clothing materials, car parts).

156 Besides all this, Hajj 'Ali is involved in a small
159 stone-cutting operation which supplies stones for house
554 building, he cooperates with his three brothers in a well-
[316] cleaning concern, and contracts government heavy equipment
[312] to build earth dams. The material evidence of his status
[427] is that he is the only man in al-Qasr with two compound-type
[342] houses (one he built thirteen years ago), and the only man
[595] with four wives.

156 with four wives. It is not hard to understand why the people
159 of al-Qasr consider Hajj 'Ali a rajal khair par excellence.
554 For instance, when I asked one man if he could give me some
627 examples of court cases, he replied: "The one who is not an
124 'aqila pays no attention to anything save getting food for his children. The rajal khair has money and men (a reference to the "old days" when a person needed cohorts for battle), and so he always pays instead of us. He lends us money and helps us in doing anything, like Hajj 'Ali does." In another
124 interview, one man showed great respect for Hajj 'Ali's tradi-
156 tional status and modern ability to deal with the outside
159 world by giving him the honorific title of "Shaikh," and
554 showing that the Bedouins of al-Qasr put their trust in him:
439 "When the olive merchants come from Alexandria, they go to
472 Shaikh 'Ali, someone who knows about olives. They ask him
245 what kind of olives al-Qasr has. He shows the merchants, and they say: 'I will give you so much for them.' They make an agreement, and Hajj 'Ali collects the olives and gets the price for them."

156 In terms of local politics, I would guess, but do
159 not have data to prove, that Hajj 'Ali was the third party
554 most frequently referred to in seeking a termination of
[627] conflict. He was commonly asked to participate in these
[114] matters not only by the disputants themselves but also by the 'aqila or other third party presiding. He was sometimes

156 He was sometimes
159 asked to sit-in as a witness for important contractual
554 matters. Note that in the rawaabit al-'awaaqil of Bait
675 Shafaila of 'Ailit Lazumi (presented in Chapter Four),
Hajj 'Ali who is neither from 'Ailit Lazumi nor an 'aqila
was present to sign and validate this document.

156 Hajj 'Ali, then, operates in the micropolitical
159 system and the traditional authority structure of al-Qasr.
554 But what is just as important, he has secured a firm foot-
hold in the modern bureaucratic structure of the near-by
town. He straddles both camps. The Governor of Marsa Matruh
635 was an important aid to my understanding of Hajj 'Ali's
634 role as "broker." The Governor claimed that the British
156 first introduced the roles of 'umda and shaikh; they did this
159 to "control the Bedouin" and to"get the men out of the tents."
554 He explained in his own way what he considered to be the
124 structural differentiation of political roles in al-Qasr.
[648]

> Let me tell you, these fellows are very clever. They have an 'umda . . . he comes to my office and says: "I want this and this." I say, "No." Then he goes back to the 'awaqil and tells them that, and then these fellows begin to think in what way they can get what they want. But the 'umda is nothing; it is the
* [613] 'aqila whom the Bedouins listen to and love . . . The 'umda is elected (at this time) by the Bedouins. They put forward a man who hesitates, one who can say yes or no . . . But there is a real leader for the people, this is a man such as Hajj 'Ali, here is a man the Bedouins love.

124 The Governor said that Hajj 'Ali speaks well and
635 thinks well. Twice in the interview the Governor said that
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Hajj 'Ali "became an 'aqila by his way of life." Of course, the fact is that Hajj 'Ali is not an 'aqila at all. Although I feel that the Governor should understand the Bedouin authority structure, he is not alone in his misconceptions. The chief agricultural engineer for the G.D.D.O., who works very closely with the Bedouins of al-Qasr, also thought that Hajj 'Ali was the 'aqila of Bait 'Umar in 'Ailit Ma'fas. Furthermore, and most impressive of all, one 'aqila in 'Ailit Dawlat and his four sons all thought that Hajj 'Ali was the 'aqila of Bait 'Umar. There is more here than just ignorance of Bedouin society on the part of officials, and disinterest on the part of the Dawlat 'aqila. There is good reason for these different parties to mistake Hajj 'Ali as a key traditional "authority" or spokesman for his corporate group. It seems clear that in their respective dealings they must have encountered Hajj 'Ali in some kind of representative capacity. The 'aqila who insisted that Hajj 'Ali was an 'aqila, even after I pointed out that he was not, lived outside the 'izba sector and hence mistook an important rajal khair for an 'aqila. The Governor understandably mistook the most influential man in al-Qasr as an 'aqila.

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There are other traits which qualify Hajj 'Ali as the singular leader of the Bedouins. A few years back, the Governor of Marsa Matruh formed a Governor's Council (Majlis al-Muhafza) made up of representatives of the Bedouin

635 [648] population of the whole Western Desert, and representatives of the Egyptian government employees working in the province. [634] The Bedouin representatives appointed to this council need not be an 'umda or a shaikh, although they may be. The oldest Bedouin member of the council, who happens to be an 'umda, told me that "the Governor picks the men who he feels understand the problems of the people."

635 124 *613 The Governor himself thinks that every Bedouin on his council is an 'aqila. He replied to my question about the criteria for membership on the Majlis al-Muhafza: "I am using a new selection system. Rather than choose the 'umda or shaikh, I choose the 'aqila. Every man on the council is an 'aqila, and the number is determined by the population of the area . . . But I appoint more men from the [619] 'Ali Ahmar (see Figures 3 and 7)[1] than from other tribes. This is because they are more numerous, and they are near Matruh where I am able to contact them immediately. The 'Ali Ahmar are represented by six men and the other tribes by just three men."

•156 159 554 635 648 [114] Hajj 'Ali is one of these six men and the only member of the Council who resides in al-Qasr. I attended and observed the December meeting of the Council. The Governor sat at the head of a long table with the Egyptian representatives on either side of him. At the other end of the table sat the Bedouin representatives, Hajj 'Ali among them. Purely

[1] [See pp. 65 & 77 respectively--Analyst]

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[871] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
[537] He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
554 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 156 159 554 635 177 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be presented to the Governor. This is purely a political process which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation [648] of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs - to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis" (1965b).

156 159 554 635 177 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his status and political leadership and the fact that he has assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr during this period of change. Once each year the Governor makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative building, the government experimental farm, and the area in general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

156 by the secretary of the cooperative society who requested
159 that the government furnish bus service between Matruh and
554 al-Qasr. The Governor thought this a good idea and said he
635 would inquire into the matter.
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156 As the Governor suggested that the meeting be adjourned,
159 Hajj 'Ali stood up, faced the Governor and began another of
554 his formal speeches in the rich tradition of Arabic; it was
635 the best Arabic I had heard spoken in the desert. This speech
177 was for the benefit of all present, Bedouins and officials
537 alike. Hajj 'Ali made no requests but simply thanked the Governor for honoring al-Qasr with his presence. In this short well-prepared tribute, he said:

> We feel the efforts of the government and we can scarcely imagine or dream of this development. For instance, we were living in tents and now only five per cent remain in tents while the remainder are in houses. We were dressed simply, but now we are dressed in poplin material. Those who could afford one set of clothes now can afford two. Thanks be to God, all this is due to Jamal Abd al-Nasser.

156 It is significant, of course, that smiles once again
159 played on the faces of the Governor's entourage and nothing
554 but admiration on the faces of the Bedouins. As Hajj 'Ali
635 spoke he did not face the Governor directly but turned aside,
537 speaking both to him and the Bedouins--Hajj 'Ali, the Bedouin, had been sitting on the ground before the Governor. The
[634] 'umda and shaikh had accompanied the Governor on his tour

156 159 554 635 537 [634] 122 [522] and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished) with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj 'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj 'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

121 177 178 We can see how these details carry larger implications within the context of political and social structures undergoing change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds important for an understanding of the process of change.

156 159 554 177 178 If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is politically active and representative in both the traditional and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social and personal reasons.

156 159 554 177 178 124 829 [571] Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came around to the subject of international politics, whether this was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

• 156 to serve other than what they eat." Hajj 'Ali is not only
159 conscious of social stratification in his society, but he also
554 has a great deal of empathy with the less endowed, a pre-
571 requisite of a traditional Bedouin leader and an advantageous
574 one for a modern leader.
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He is aware of most traditional institutions and how
156 they relate to conditions of modernity. Hajj 'Ali, whose own
159 marriages speak for his political acumen, sees only disadvantages
554 in the cousin-right marriage custom of the Bedouins. His
829 interest in getting on with the business of change, so to
582 speak, has led him to question a basic right contained in the Bedouin principle of lineage structure and corporate membership.

> A thing which I do not like about our customs is the idea that a man has a right to his uncle's daughter. The man binds his cousin and in the end he might not marry her and will be the cause of her never marrying. He gives himself the authority to decide whom she may or may not marry. If he knows she desires to marry a certain man, he says: "She can marry anyone but not that one."

[562] Here he challenges the traditional right of the individual male in Bedouin society, favoring the rights of the female.

[177] The emancipation of the female, especially in rights and
[178] duties concerned with the marriage contract, is an element
[562] of the modernization process in Egyptian society and the Middle East in general.

* 613 The bait, as a political group, is in part structurally
602 defined by the corporate principle which states that blood-kin
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* 613 602 571 682 at this lineage level must bear collective responsibility in matters of compensation and blood-revenge. This principle, as we have seen, is extended until the whole 'aiela is included in a symbolic expression of corporate group solidarity. In order for this expression to persist, of course, the mechanism, or ideology, of blood-revenge must be maintained. [124] All of my informants, though they disagreed over the details of revenge, insisted that it was the inviolable right of the • 156 159 554 829 682 Arabs. But Hajj 'Ali took exception to the practice of blood-revenge for a number of reasons. He said:

> The world changes. Before it was only the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and the Border Guards which kept order. The government now enters into the matter of killings. Personally, I do not agree with the custom and the way it operates. In the case of killing, for instance, someone who is not worth anything, and has no brains, kills one from another tribe. Then the tribe of the [178] killer asks for the nazaala, and a third party becomes involved. The third party agrees to guard the killer's bait for twelve months and the business of all those involved must stop. A member of the third party's family must accompany each member of the killer's tribe. But even after the twelve months one must live in fear at his own home, for after the twelve months the tribe of the deceased will try to kill the best man in the killer's tribe. How many good ones do we have in one tribe? I have heard that in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the deceased man's family has the right to kill the killer only . . . (I then commented that perhaps blood-revenge functions to discourage killing in the desert.) But there are unbalanced people who actually commit murder just to tease their tribe: they have nothing to fear because no one is interested in killing them in retaliation.

In challenging the Arabs' traditional right to blood-revenge, Hajj 'Ali--besides questioning a structural basis of

156 the group--in effect questions a great deal about the whole
159 traditional authority structure. Blood-revenge functions as
554 a deterrent to social disorder in that it represents an
829 automatic mechanism for restoring a balance of good relations
682 in the society. Actually, Hajj 'Ali exaggerated to make a
[182] point when he spoke of the existence of "unbalanced people."
682 A person would indeed be "unbalanced" who did not take into
672 consideration the repercussions of his acts with respect to
* 613 the personal danger and the dishonor and shame it would bring
to his 'aiela and bait. Although the 'aiela members are
willing to share in the blood money for accidental or unpre-
meditated killings, it is wrong to suppose that the Bedouins
do not attempt to weigh the justifiability and culpability
[671] in matters of killing. The very existence of the 'awaiyid
Awlad 'Ali argues against this. Obviously, the dichotomy made
between killing in the 'awaiyid, i.e., intentional and accidental,
and the concomitant gradation in compensation points to some
kind of reasonable consideration in cases of killing.

156 Hajj 'Ali is discontent with yet another aspect of
159 the traditional authority structure. He questions the logic
554 and authority represented in the oath as a sacred sanction.
695 This says something about the degree of secularization which
829 Hajj 'Ali has undergone. Although he does not say so, he
apparently favors a more secular and logical procedure for
determining a man's guilt or innocence.

156 159 554 695 829 Another thing which I do not like about our old ways is the idea of swearing the oath. For instance, if I steal 1,000 L.E. from you, then you will accuse me. The 'aqila will then come to me and say: "If you did not steal the money, swear the oath." Some of my family will support me in this, swearing that I did not steal the money. The swearing of the oath will take place at a tomb, in the presence of the Quran. This tomb belongs to a dead man, and they tell you that he is a saint. First of all, the thief will swear the oath and then they will believe him; and, secondly, what is the sense of swearing in front of a dead body?

[784] Hajj 'Ali made no mention of God or of the Bedouin belief that misfortune will be visited upon the one who swears the oath in bad faith. There is an Arabic proverb which Hajj 'Ali repeated here which says in effect that "the thief will always swear."

156 159 554 829 178 Hajj 'Ali actively challenges the traditional basis of the Bedouin moral and political community. Striving to do away with prescribed cousin-right in marriage and the mechanisms of blood-revenge and the oath as means of supporting law and order in al-Qasr is a course which we might expect from an Egyptian official who seeks to integrate the Bedouins into national society. And, in fact, these are all customs which the Governor believes must eventually be eradicated. It is not surprising that Hajj 'Ali's son believes that "it is not civilized" to lay claim to his cousin for, like his father, he also is redefining morality vis a vis "civilization."

It appears obvious in all that he says, including his comments at the Governor's reception, that Hajj 'Ali has

156 undertaken to transform his rajal khair role into an authority
159 which transcends the bounds of the local community. During
554 my talks with him, he never once insinuated that the people
829 of al-Qasr, nor even the 'Aishaibat or 'Ali Ahmar (terms
178 he rarely ever used), owe anything to a larger entity or
community known as "the Bedouin" or "the Awlad 'Ali."
If Hajj 'Ali is to legitimate his own authority in a new
political system, he must, at the same time, show the Bedouins
829 the legitimacy of the new political community. The Bedouins
178 must feel a moral commitment toward the new national political
177 community or else it has no meaning or authority. Most of the
Bedouins of al-Qasr still take it for granted that the alloca-
tion of political values and distribution of power in terms of
traditional and modern legal roles will be carried over into
the modern community and its politics. Hence, if anyone should
[634] go on to Cairo to represent the Bedouin of the Western Desert,
[648] naturally it should be the 'umda or the shaikh "who knew how
to deal with the Egyptians." The majority of the people of
the al-Qasr area see change coming but do not conceptualize
it as any threat to the traditional authority structure.

156 Hajj 'Ali anticipates the change as fundamental
159 enough to require a new sense of identity. I think this is
554 evident in the following statement in which he takes issue
829 with the traditional way of doing things and appears to be
178 preparing himself for a role in the readjustment process.
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There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the 'awaiyid nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next 'umda) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the 'awaiyid either.

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This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one 'aqila voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

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If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their 'umda because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

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Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the 'awaiyid as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

156 159 554 178 177 829 the 'umda, Hajj 'Ali seems to imply that he himself is capable of understanding and leading the Bedouins during this period.

Hajj 'Ali has formulated some positive and constructive ideas relating to the period of transition which now faces al-Qasr, and they are related to his analysis of the pressing needs of the day.

> The Bedouins need many things: they need factories as there are in the Nile Valley. For the desert, here in particular, we need olive presses. This will raise the profits of the farmer . . . We need [244] [489] a factory for canning tomatoes, for the whole desert plants them and the transportation is such that we cannot get them to the market . . . The biggest change in the desert results from the presence of 12,000 government workers; there were only 20 or [871] 30 before the World War. There were no schools, now there a few. You cannot find a six year-old boy who does not go to school; about thirty per cent of the girls in al-Qasr go to school also . . . Another cause of change is due to the fact that everyone now watches his neighbor, he sees what he [207] does and he imitates him. Today, I listen to the radio and tomorrow my neighbor buys one. Evolution (tatawwar) is taking place, and the people here are [212] realistic about it. For instance, I do not know reading and writing, and sometimes I must dictate a letter to my son . . . My son knows better than I, and I know better than my father did, who lived in al-Qasr for thirty five years without knowing anything about the streets of Marsa Matruh.

156 159 554 178 177 Hajj 'Ali is both subjective and objective about change, as we can note from the comment about the radio. In a non-doctrinaire fashion, Hajj 'Ali stresses the great value of education while being aware of his own deficiencies in this area. However, as a counterbalance, he seems to

imply that one cannot be educated and know the 'awaiyid at the same time--the attitude of a self-made man. Hajj 'Ali realizes his marginal position between the new and the old, and his attitude concerning change through education seems to be that of an unselfish leader. Elaborating further on the role of education, Hajj 'Ali showed insight into some of the psychological aspects underlying social change:

> As I said before, the people here are realistic about change. There are now only about three or four of us who send our sons to study at the university, the rest of the people are waiting to see what these boys will amount to. The other day, one of our educated boys, an officer in the army, came to visit al-Qasr. All of the women are now hoping to see their sons become as successful as this. This is exactly like the first time we cultivated olives in the desert: the Bedouins mocked those who planted the olive. After the olive began to show profits, everyone regretted that they did not cultivate it. Time is changing, and the people are changing. Education is the basis of everything in any nation. Now the agricultural engineer directs me, telling me what to do and how to do it . . . and before 1952 (pre-Nassar regime) they knew nothing about us and we had nothing.

As culture and social change proceeds in al-Qasr, it is evident that Hajj 'Ali and the national political community are becoming legitimate authorities in the eyes of the Bedouins. This is indicated by the following event. One month before I left the field, the first vice-President of the Republic was expected to visit the province of Marsa Matruh, and al-Qasr was named as one of the places which he would tour. Hajj 'Ali took it upon himself to set up three tents in the tradi-

156 tional style of Bedouin hospitality--"as we used to do in
159 Cyrenaica"--and spent a total of 50 L.E. for the welcoming
554 ceremony. "This money was from his own pocket," as the
829 Bedouins of al-Qasr complained after it was learned that
574 the vice-President would not visit Matruh after all. As
648 a matter of fact, all of the Bedouin leaders who had been
invited to the reception by Hajj 'Ali refused to eat the
food, for they said that it had not been prepared for them.
[576] This act was taken as a show of respect for Hajj 'Ali and
anger with bureaucrats.

156 Hajj 'Ali is the representative of al-Qasr to the
159 Arab Socialist Union which meets in Marsa Matruh and has
554 cell meetings in al-Qasr. The socialist cell in al-Qasr
648 meets about three times a month. When I asked why Hajj 'Ali
668 was the man chosen to represent all of al-Qasr at section
[124] meetings of the Union, the reply was: "Because he is a member
[635] of the Majlis al-Muhafza." There was one section meeting
of the Union in Matruh while I was in the field. The theme
of the meeting was "The Meaning of Socialism." Hajj 'Ali
attended this meeting.

156 In sum, it seems not too far afield to say that Hajj
159 'Ali is prepared to take over the leadership of the Bedouins
554 in a much more sophisticated manner than one could possibly
expect from the traditional style of politics. Hajj 'Ali's
[634] comments about the 'umda and the 'umda's probable successor

156 imply that he feels they are not really equipped to represent
159 their traditional constituency. Hajj 'Ali, as everyone in
554 al-Qasr knows, is traditional and modern at the same time.
634 It seems that he has only alienated those whom he threatens and those who are a threat to him, i.e., the 'umda and the shaikh.

156 He may not be educated, but he knows the 'awaiyid;
159 at the same time he stresses the fact that his son will have
554 the education which he never had. Empathy is a primary trait
212 of the charismatic leader and the "cultural broker" who seeks to manipulate social relations. No one could explain to me why Hajj 'Ali did not have an education while his brother (who is only three years younger) and other members of the "status group" do read and write. He perhaps only became concerned in the period of change. Hajj 'Ali, the "cultural broker," is more politically conscious and creative within the context of two worlds in change.

it was impossible to verify the actual facts or to know what exactly happened. But since the parties involved are still alive and since these events are closely related to present-day happenings, the case is still alive in the minds of the parties involved as well as those of outsiders- Naturlaly, each party tries to present the facts in such a way as to support his own claims. Shei'eb, for example, insists that Hakim had bribed members of bait Asabei' to refuse to pay their share in order to embarrass him and make him appear as unable to perform his duties as Aqila. "Hakim always had his eyes on becoming the Aqila of bait Asabei'," said Shei'eb, "but he had no business becoming the Aqila, so he had to make me look bad to the other Awaqil.... He likes to be looked up to as a big man, but it wouldn't work." While other members of bait Asabei' deny that Hakim had bribed them, they agree with Shei'eb that Hakim is a dishonest man. In fact, Hakim's reputation is so widespread in the area that it has earned him the nickname of "the thief". The nickname was given to him a few years ago when he went to Mecca for a pilgrimage with another fellow tribesman. The latter told the story that while in Mecca Hakim had found a purse with two hundred pounds in it. He was supposed to return the purse to the authorities or it would be considered as stealing if he kept it. Stealing in Mecca is not only a crime but also a great sin which makes the holy trip void for the offender. Hakim told his companion that he had given the purse to the authorities. But later, on their way back from Mecca, the friend found the purse hidden in Hakim's luggage. When the story was known in the area, he was referred to as "the thief". Other accounts of Hakim's dishonesty are told throughout the area, including stories of how he acquired his wealth through stealing

156 [685] [439] equipment from the government projects and from smuggling sheep and merchandise across the Libyan border. Although some of these stories might be exaggerated, they all point to the fact that Hakim, despite his wealth, is not the most popular or reputable individual in bait Asabei', and that although Shei'eb is not a popular individual either, he definitely comes up the winner in any popularity contest between the two. The question is 156 613 558 682 683 why Hakim was selected by the Awaqil to replace Shei'eb. The case involved more than Shei'eb's inability to collect the money from members of his bait. Shei'eb's ineffectiveness seemed to have been taken as an excuse rather than as the direct cause. Many Aqaqil, before Shei'eb, had failed in collecting money from their own bait without being subject to direct challenge. What seems to be involved is more than a challenge to a particular member, Shei'eb. It is a challenge to the whole principle by which Shei'eb acquired his position as Aqila of bait Asabei': patrilineal succession.

156 159 613 463 683 554 [428] [779] Shei'eb is the youngest of four sons of the former Aqila of bait Asabei', Sheikh Elewa. For more than fifty years Sheikh Elewa was the undisputed Aqila of bait Asabei'. He also had considerable influence among other tribal segments throughout the whole of the Western Desert by virtue of his position as "nazzar", that is, the expert who assesses the amount of compensation for wound inflicted in a liable case. The position of nazzar is a hereditary one and had been handed down from father to son. The basis for his assessment of wounds are a number of old books believed to be obtained from Mecca and contain all the judgments of famous Islamic leaders in their assessments of wounds.

[428] Eleven years ago when Sheikh Elewa became blind and too old to

156 exercise his functions, he invited all the important people in the area
159 into a large gathering during which he announced that he was handing the
613 sacred books to Shei'eb, who was to become the nazzar and also to succeed
463 him as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Although at that time Shei'eb was
683 fairly young, twenty-six, nobody questioned Sheikh Elewa's decision.
554 "He is the Aqila," said one informant, "and he has the right to decide
428 which of his sons is to succeed him. After all, he knows his sons better
[179] than anybody else and knows which one is best for the job." Most people
156 thought that Sheikh Elewa, being still alive and with clear thinking,
159 would help Shei'eb in performing his duties as Aqila. A few months after
613 Shei'eb took over his father's position, it became apparent that he was
554 too immature for the job. He tried to use his position to take money
578 from members of his bait and when they refused to give him any money, he
[661] entered into fights with a number of them. Rumors spread that he took
bribes from the disputing parties who came to him for him to assess the
legal compensation for wounds to raise or lower his estimate. But still
people within bait Asabei' as well as outside it respected Sheikh Elewa's
decision and did not challenge Shei'eb openly. But as time passed the
dissatisfaction with Shei'eb grew. This dissatisfaction came mainly from
members of the Amar who were affected directly by Shei'eb's actions, es-
pecially those actions which resulted in the payment of compensation for
wounds inflicted in fights.

PHASE II

439 On the evening of May 16, 1966, two members of the Geneishat tribe
of Matruh area came to Burg-el-Arab with a large shipment of smuggled
cigarettes to leave with their partner in the area, Hadi, from the

refused to see them. Later Hakim had Shei'eb spread the rumor that Qudura had taken a bribe from the Geneishat to refuse to take the oath, and the story of an old dispute between Qudura, on the one hand, and both Hakim and Shei'eb, on the other. This dispute dates back to the time when the Awaqil of the Aggary Amar decided to replace Shei'eb with Hakim as the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Shortly after the decision of the Aggary Awaqil was publicly known, Qudura was very unhappy and refused to recognize it. His reaction was not out of loyalty to Shei'eb whom he thought was a very unfit person for the position, but it stemmed rather, from a deep resentment of Hakim. According to my information, Qudura's position was met with sympathy by the majority of the people outside the Aggary Amar who share with him the belief that Hakim was a dishonest person who could not be trusted as a representative of bait Asabei'. It was at that time that the stories of Hakim's dishonest dealings were being discussed publicly, mainly by Qudura and members of his camp. At that time many believed that Qudura was the best man for the position of Aqila of bait Asabei' and that he was the only qualified member of that bait. He was the oldest able man in the bait, and although he was poor, yet he was known throughout the area for his honesty and sound decision. In fact many people in the area told me that they believe Qudura to be the only honest member of bait Asabei'. Realizing that Qudura was getting all the attention, Hakim sent his son Rabbu to Qudura with a message that Hakim acknowledged Qudura as the Aqila and that he (Hakim) had neither the time nor the interest in taking the position himself. Hakim also conveyed the view that he would support Qudura if the latter denounced Shei'eb and appointed himself in his place. Qudura agreed and a date

was set for a meeting in which Quadra was to announce his decision. Meanwhile, Qudura stopped attacking Hakim and directed his attack toward the inadequacy of Shei'eb as the Aqila.

The meeting was held two weeks later and all the important people in the area were invited. After dinner was served Qudura announced his agreement with Hakim to become the Aqila of bait Asabei' replacing Shei'eb. Everybody expected Hakim to support Qudura in his claim, but instead Hakim directed his comment to Qudura telling him that there had been a misunderstanding on Qudura's part and that all his message to Qudura was to acknowledge the latter as the Aqila for his own camp alone not for bait Asabei' as a whole as Qudura claimed. This announcement was a surprise to everyone in the meeting since this meant recognizing the camp of Qudura as a separate bait, a result which nobody, including Qudura, had ever anticipated. Qudura was very angry and dissolved the meeting immediately. Ever since that incident, the relationship between Qudura and Hakim has been very unfriendly. Almost all of my informants explained Qudura's failure to show up at the oath as a means of revenge against Hakim who had embarrassed him among the people who attended the meeting. Qudura himself had told me later that the reason for his not coming to the oath was that he was not sure that Rabbu was innocent:

> Rabbu has been known to do these thins (inform the police) and I cannot trust him. I cannot take a false oath and endanger myself for someone like Rabbuh. Besides, Hakim never came to me to discuss the oath like he did with all the others who were to swear with them. If he had brought his son and come to me before I would have been able to tell whether they were lying or not, and If not, I would have sworn with a clear conscience and without fear. The oath is something that one does not take lightly. It involves the supernatural.

When Qudura refused to see Hakim and Shei'eb, Hakim asked Sheikh Saleh, the Aqila of one of the most powerful baits in the area, to talk

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to Qudura and to tell him that Hakim wanted to show his respect. This means in everyday parlance that Hakim was willing to pay him money. Qudura agreed to meet Hakim the following day.

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On the day of the meeting, to which I was invited, Hakim arrived with his son and gifts of three goats, tea and sugar. One of the goats was slaughtered and supper was prepared for the guests. While the guests were eating, Hakim and Qudura disappeared inside one of the tents for more than an hour. When they finally joined the gathering, Hakim announced that he and Qudura were now brothers and that it was his fault that Qudura was angry because he had accused him of being stupid and misunderstanding the content of the message sent to him after the meeting of the Aggary awawil. "I admit," said Hakim, "that I might have meant at one time and probably said it to sheikh Qudura that I wanted him to be the Aqila of bait Asabei'. Now that I have admitted this, Sheikh Qudura should not have any grudges against me or my son." Then Qudura addressed the gathering and said, in a very cold and dry manner, "I am glad that Hakim has come to this senses and admitted his mistake." The gathering lasted for most of the evening, spent mostly in behind-the-scenes meetings involving Hakim, Qudura and different guests. Then as the last guest left, Shei'eb, who had been inside the tent throughtout the evening came out and said that Hakim was a fool and that Qudura had tricked him into admitting publicly that he had lied and that Qudura still refused to take the oath.

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Qudura's stand created a strong reaction which affected almost all the tribal segments in the area. The case overshadowed any other event and was the main topic of discussion. The reaction was mixed, however.

613 Other tribal segments outside the Aggary amar supported the position of
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578 Qudura, and most took his position to prove their notion about his hon-
156 esty and the fact that despite his poverty, he could not be bribed. They were also pleased with Qudura's trick which demonstrated Hakim's dishonest
613 techniques. Within the Aggary amar, the general sentiment was still with
578 Hakim although his confession of cheating Qudura made it difficult to
156 support him openly. They directed their attack against Qudura who in their view violated the solidarity of the amar and even of his bait and showed it as divided and noncohesive. They were also fearful that Qudura's
[685] refusal to pay would cause the amar to pay the Geneishat the full compensation for the action of Rabbuh, a sum which, as one said, would put the amar in debt for generations to come. The strongest impact of the events affected bait Asabei'itself and left it one step from complete fission into three distinct groups. Shei'eb, finding the tide turning against Hakim, found a chance to assert his claim to the position of the Aqila, stating openly that he would never forfeit his hereditary right. On the other hand, finding the popularity of Qudura increasing rapidly, he started attacking him verbally and even threatened to beat him. He in-
[681] sisted that Qudura and his sons should be excluded from the amar and given the barawa.

613 The word "barawa" is derived from the Arabic verb "bara" which means to
681 cure one's self of an illness. It also means to sever social ties with
[192] undesirable persons. The term is used among Awlad Ali in a much restrited sense to refer to the process by which a tribal segment detaches itself from any responsibility for the actions of a particular member. It is

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This apparently is not a typical case, nor is Fatma by any means representative of a typical tribal women. It is a case of a marginal woman who had revolted against the tribal definition of a female role. She violated the customary ways of her society and claimed her share of her father's inheritance; and by doing this, she forfeited her right to protection by her brothers. She was able to do this because of her marginality which enabled her to draw upon sources of protection outside the tribal pattern, the police. It is interesting to note here that by doing so, she was not totally eliminated or ostracized from her society; rather, her role was redefined as that of a man, and she was treated as such.